1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II — 1988–1995: Oslo Opens, Iran Rejects the Road to Peace

by Janet Lessinupdated on June 26, 2026June 26, 2026

1988–1995: The Palestinian Authority Chose Diplomacy — Iran Rejected It

In 1988, the PA recognized Israel and began negotiations. The Oslo Accords (1993–1995) formalized that path.

Iran opposed this shift as an attempt to stabilize a Middle East that aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests and instead aligned with those who rejected Oslo—including Hamas. The Accords did not resolve the conflict—they restructured it under unequal power dynamics, leaving room for rejectionist movements to grow.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, entered direct negotiations with Israel through the Oslo Accords. These agreements created the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim governing body to administer parts of the West Bank and Gaza.

Arafat secured leadership of the PA because he already headed the PLO, internationally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people; he formally recognized Israel’s right to exist, and he renounced certain forms of armed struggle.

The U.S. and Israel accepted him as a negotiating partner, calculating that a centralized authority could stabilize the territories. With this, Arafat returned from exile (1994) and became head of the newly formed PA, exercising limited self-rule under Israeli security oversight.

Iran renounced the PLO for recognizing Israel & renouncing armed struggle. From Iran’s perspective, Oslo legitimized Israel and entrenched U.S. regional influence, replaced armed struggle with negotiated compromise, and elevated Arafat and the PA for their willingness to coexist with Israel.

Iran instead backed terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah, viewing them as the more effective vehicle to resist and ultimately derail the Oslo process.

The PA ostensibly represented a cooperative structure imposed from above. Iran’s alignment with Hamas cultivated a counter-system of domination from below.

2000–2005: The Second Intifada Violently Broke the PA-Israeli Peace Attempt

By 2000, the Oslo framework had failed to produce a final settlement. Frustration, mistrust, and unresolved core issues (Jerusalem, borders, refugees, settlements) reached a breaking point. Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was the immediate trigger, but the underlying system was already unstable.

Sharon led Israel’s Likud party (the main opposition party in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset) and served as a general and defense minister under Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In early 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister, partly due to the shift in Israeli public opinion during the violence.

The Second Intifada rapidly transformed from protest into sustained conflict. This time, the Intifada expanded with suicide bombings inside Israeli cities, armed ambushes, and roadside attacks. The Israeli military responded with intensified large-scale incursions into PA-controlled areas, targeted killings of militant leaders, and reoccupying key West Bank cities. Civilian casualties rose sharply on both sides.

The violence reshaped the political landscape. Israeli public opinion shifted toward security-first policies. Palestinian society is fractured between PA governance structures and armed factions (especially Hamas). Trust between the leaderships collapsed almost completely, and the Israelis undermined the PA.

In Oslo, the Intifada unraveled. Joint Israeli–Palestinian coordination mechanisms broke down, movement restrictions and closures intensified, Israeli settlement expansion continued amid conflict, and negotiations became politically untenable. Oslo negotiations did not formally end—but they ceased to function as a viable pathway.

For Iran, the Intifada validated its earlier rejection of the Oslo Accords. The Intifada strengthened ties with Hamas and other armed groups, supported continued resistance rather than negotiation, and demonstrated that violence could disrupt diplomacy.

As the PA weakened, non-state militant networks gained relative power. The cooperator pathway (Oslo/PA) narrowed under pressure from unmet expectations and loss of legitimacy, but the dominator pathway (armed resistance/counterforce) expanded through visible impact and external backing. The system did not gradually fail—it flipped modes from negotiated coexistence to mutual coercion and fragmentation

1993–2000: Iran Built Relationships with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon

Iran provided funding, training, and weapons support, Hezbollah acted as a model and intermediary, and Hamas expanded its military and political reach into Palestine and harassed Israel without triggering a direct Iran vs Israel war.

2000–2002: The Second Intifada Intensified Israeli-Palestinian Violence & the Collapse of Trust in the Oslo Accords

In 2002, Israeli forces intercepted a ship carrying weapons. Israel and the U.S. linked it to Iran and Palestinian actors (some journalists questioned whether the evidence fully proved direct top-level involvement).

The SHIP, Karine A, carried 50 tons of rockets, anti-tank missiles, and explosives.

Israel and the United States said the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat arranged the shipment. Arafat denied direct involvement. The incident convinced Israeli leadership that negotiation on the surface could coexist with militarization beneath it.

The Palestinian arena became connected to broader regional supply and support networks, and the Iranian model of pressuring Israel developed from a localized territorial dispute into a networked, multi-front pressure system.

The dominators on both the Israeli and Iranian sides concluded that peace was temporary. The voices in Israel that called for peace concluded that without trust, even legal treaty agreements could not bring peace.

By 2002, the Oslo framework collapsed, and a shadowy network of proxies and escalating distrust took up the struggle against the Jews.

2004–2006: Hamas Prevailed in Gaza

In 2004, Arafat died, perhaps murdered. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.

In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian elections; Hamas was no longer just a militant group; it became a governing force. Iran increased support for it.

2007: Hamas Took Gaza & the Split Between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza Became Permanent

In 2007, violent clashes between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority led to Hamas’s control of Gaza and the PA’s control (sort of) of the West Bank.

The arrangement meant an end to unified Arab leadership in the Palestinian territories and to the Oslo Accords’ territorial vision. Hamas emerged from social breakdown and failed leadership legitimacy, not foreign invention.

Oslo structured inequality rather than resolving it, and proxy warfare between the feuding PA and Hamas in the Gaza area.

Iran had neither conquered Palestine nor created Hamas. But Iran supported hostile movements in areas Israel had conquered. Iran sustained its proxy terrorists’ fight against Israel with money, training, and alignment, and helped Hamas survive long enough to become a governing power.

Gaza became a forward node in Iran’s network strategy that shifted the war between the Israelis and Palestinians to a war between two networks, the Iranian network vs the Israeli-American network.

Author Bio

Assistant / Contributor Bio

Janet Kira Lessin is an author, experiencer, broadcaster, publisher, and co-founder of Aquarian Media. She assists with research, editing, article development, image concepts, publication support, and multimedia presentation.

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1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II

1988–1995 — The Palestinian Authority Chose Diplomacy; Iran Rejected It

Lead Author: Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D.
Contributing Author: Janet Kira Lessin
© 2026 Aquarian Media

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1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II — 1988–1995: The Palestinian Authority Chose Diplomacy; Iran Rejected It

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From 1988 to 1995, the Palestinian Authority and PLO entered the Oslo path of recognition, negotiation, and limited self-rule, while Iran rejected that diplomatic framework and expanded support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and proxy resistance against Israel.

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In Part II of 1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S., Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., with contributing author Janet Kira Lessin, traces the period during which the Palestinian Authority entered diplomacy through the Oslo Accords, while Iran rejected compromise and strengthened ties with anti-Oslo forces. The article examines how a possible path toward coexistence became trapped between unequal power, proxy war, mistrust, and the dominator systems that fed future catastrophe.

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Between 1988 and 1995, one path opened, and another hardened.

The Palestinian leadership, through the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, recognized Israel, entered negotiations, and accepted the Oslo framework as a route toward limited self-rule. Iran rejected that route. Tehran saw Oslo as a U.S.-Israeli structure that legitimized Israel, restrained armed struggle, and weakened the revolutionary resistance model Iran preferred.

This chapter examines the fork in the road: diplomacy on one side, proxy war on the other. Oslo did not solve the conflict. It structured Palestinian life under unequal power, left core issues unresolved, and created openings for Hamas, Hezbollah, and other rejectionist forces to grow.

Part II asks the central question: What happens when diplomacy appears, but systems of domination on every side keep preparing for war?

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1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II
1988–1995 — The Palestinian Authority Chose Diplomacy; Iran Rejected It

In this second installment, Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., with contributing author Janet Kira Lessin, examines the pivotal Oslo years.

The Palestinian Authority and PLO moved toward recognition, negotiation, and limited self-rule. Iran rejected that path, viewing Oslo as a U.S.-Israeli stabilizing project that undermined armed resistance. The result was not peace, but a divided field where diplomacy weakened, proxy warfare expanded, and civilians remained trapped between competing dominator systems.

This article follows the road from the First Intifada to Oslo, from hope to distrust, from negotiation to the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah as regional pressure points.

Read Part II now at Dragon at the End of Time.

#Iran #Israel #Palestine #OsloAccords #Hamas #Hezbollah #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #DominatorVsCooperator #SashaAlexLessin #JanetKiraLessin #AquarianMedia

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1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II
1988–1995: The Palestine Liberation Organization chose diplomacy. Iran rejected it.

Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., with Janet Kira Lessin, traces Oslo, Hamas, Hezbollah, proxy warfare, and the collapse of trust.

#Iran #Israel #Palestine #OsloAccords #Hamas #Hezbollah #Geopolitics

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New Article: 1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II — 1988–1995: The Palestinian Authority Chose Diplomacy; Iran Rejected It

Lead author Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., with contributing author Janet Kira Lessin, examines the geopolitical shift from the First Intifada into the Oslo Accords.

This installment explores how the PLO and the Palestinian Authority entered into a framework of recognition and negotiation, while Iran rejected Oslo as a U.S.-Israeli stabilization project. The article follows the growth of Hamas and Hezbollah as proxy forces, the weakening of trust, and the conflict between negotiated coexistence and armed resistance.

At the heart of the essay lies a larger theme: when dominator systems compete for control, civilians pay the price.

#MiddleEast #Geopolitics #Iran #Israel #Palestine #OsloAccords #ConflictAnalysis #PeaceStudies #AquarianMedia

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Iran, Israel & the U.S. Part II: Oslo, Hamas & the Path Diplomacy Couldn’t Hold

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From 1988 to 1995, the Palestinian leadership entered a diplomatic path through recognition, negotiation, and the Oslo Accords. Iran rejected that route, viewing Oslo as a U.S.-Israeli framework that legitimized Israel and weakened armed resistance.

In 1987–Now: Iran, Israel, & the U.S. Part II, lead author Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., with contributing author Janet Kira Lessin, examines how the Oslo process created the Palestinian Authority, how Iran aligned with anti-Oslo movements, and how Hamas and Hezbollah became part of a broader proxy-war strategy.

This episode explores the clash between diplomacy and domination, negotiated coexistence and armed resistance, official peace processes and shadow networks.

Please like, share, subscribe, and support peace, compassion, cooperation, and the end of civilian suffering.

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Iran, Israel, Palestine, Palestinian Authority, PLO, Oslo Accords, Hamas, Hezbollah, Middle East history, geopolitics, Iran Israel conflict, proxy war, Sasha Alex Lessin, Janet Kira Lessin, Aquarian Media

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Iran, Israel, Palestine, Palestinian Authority, PLO, Oslo Accords, Hamas, Hezbollah, First Intifada, Second Intifada, Gaza, West Bank, Middle East, Geopolitics, Proxy War, U.S. Foreign Policy, War and Peace, Dominator vs Cooperator, Sasha Alex Lessin, Janet Kira Lessin, Aquarian Media

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#Iran #Israel #Palestine #PalestinianAuthority #PLO #OsloAccords #Hamas #Hezbollah #FirstIntifada #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #ProxyWar #WarAndPeace #DominatorVsCooperator #SashaAlexLessinPhD #JanetKiraLessin #AquarianMedia

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The Palestinian Authority chose diplomacy; Iran chose the forces that rejected it.

Oslo opened a door, but unequal power, mistrust, and proxy warfare kept war waiting in the hallway.

Iran did not create Hamas, but Iran recognized how useful Hamas could become once the PLO entered negotiations.

Diplomacy cannot survive when every side prepares for betrayal.

The dominator seeks control through pressure. The cooperator seeks survival through restraint. Civilians live beneath the collision.

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Please share this article to promote historical understanding, compassion, restraint, and peace. May humanity move beyond domination, proxy warfare, and civilian sacrifice toward cooperation, mutual survival, and care for all peoples and beings.

Author Bio

Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D., earned his doctorate in Anthropology from UCLA. He writes and teaches on Anunnaki history, consciousness, dominator systems, partnership models, tantra, counseling, and humanity’s long struggle to move from coercion toward cooperation. His work examines how inherited hierarchies, war systems, and control narratives shape human history—and how cooperation offers a path beyond them. The page already carries this Sasha bio in the author section.

Contributing Author Bio

Janet Kira Lessin is an author, experiencer, broadcaster, publisher, and co-founder of Aquarian Media. She contributes research, editing, article development, image concepts, publication support, and multimedia presentation. Her work bridges experiencer testimony, geopolitical analysis, Anunnaki studies, consciousness, disclosure, and the human struggle to transform domination into cooperation. The page also lists Janet as an assistant/contributor with these roles.

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Read, share, and discuss Part II: the years when diplomacy appeared, Iran rejected it, proxy forces grew, and the civilian battlefield widened.

#Iran #USIran #StraitOfHormuz #DominatorVsCooperator #MiddleEastConflict #WarAndPeace #Geopolitics #HumanCost #NoWar #SashaAlexLessinPhD

Please share this post to promote understanding and peace, to inhibit violence, and to embrace compassion, and, ultimately, to balance competition and cooperation by addressing the needs of all peoples and beings, and the ecological demands of the Earth itself.